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Abstract
In many countries the government supports individuals' and companies'
donations dedicated to charity organizations or { more general { to public
goods. Yet the e®ects of governmental support with respect to the provision
of public goods has been and still is subject to an extensive debate in the
economic literature. Starting from Warr's (1982, 1983) famous neutrality
result an array of conditions has been identi¯ed under which this result holds
or not.
In this paper we examine the commonly used policy approach to subsi-
dize the private provision of public goods by granting agents deductions with
respect to their income or corporate tax burden. We especially take into ac-
count that most income tax schemes are progressive and that deductibility
is limited. The problems that arise from these speci¯c properties of the con-
sidered tax-refund schemes are pointed out ¯rst. We then turn towards the
e®ects which such a tax-refund scheme has with respect to the provision of
the public good on the one hand and individual as well as aggregate wel-
fare on the other hand. We show that the e®ects of this commonly practised
method of supporting private public good provision depend crucially on the
speci¯c properties of the progressive tax scheme and the preference structure
of agents. While Pareto-improvements and even Pareto-e±ciency can result
from the implementation of such a scheme, it is also conceivable that at least
some agents perceive a utility reduction. Due to the dependency of welfare
e®ects on the tari® structure, income tax reforms as they are planned in many
countries might not only induce a reduction in private public good provision,
but might also alter the induced welfare e®ects.
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In many countries like Germany, Switzerland and the US, the government supports
individuals' and companies' donations dedicated to charity organizations. Gov-
ernments support donations by granting reductions in the donators' income and
corporate taxes.
Among the abetted organizations are those espousing science, social welfare and
culture. The activities of these organizations can widely be considered to represent
public goods (see e.g. Kingma 1989, Jones and Posnett 1994 as well as Khanna,
Posnett and Sandler 1995).
However, the e®ect of governmental support on the public good provision level
is questionable, as economic literature suggests. This is due to the neutrality result
(re)discovered by Warr (1982, 1983). It states that, as long as interior Nash equilibria
prevail, redistribution of income among agents is neutral. Income transfers are
called neutral if they do not a®ect the total public good provision and the individual
agent's consumption of private goods. Prior to this, the neutrality result had already
been noticed by Becker (1974), while Barro (1974) had formally demonstrated that
neutrality may even hold for intergenerational transfers.
Warr's analysis has been discussed extensively in the literature on the private
provision of public goods. Kemp (1984) extends Warr's `neutrality theorem' to the
case of more than one public good. His analysis has been further developed by
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), Cornes and Schweinberger (1996) as well as
recently by Cornes and Itaya (2003). Boadway, Pestieau and Wildasin (1989) point
out that transfers may be neutral even when there are distortions in the shape of
taxes and subsidies on private goods or factors, strictly local public goods, or on
goods that are public to all. Varian (1994) ¯nds that neutrality may also occur for
Stackelberg equilibria. Shibata (2003) as well as Shibata and Ihori (2003) show that
the Nash equilibrium quantity of a negative public good may be independent not only
of income distribution but also of the aggregate income of the set of contributors.
These results suggest that unconditional income transfers would only cause a
shifting of public good provision among individuals while leaving the overall provi-
sion level, as well as individual welfare, unchanged.
Nevertheless, the literature also identi¯es several reasons why transfers may be
non-neutral with respect to private public good provision. Bergstrom, Blume and
Varian (1986) show that income redistribution may a®ect private provision, when
corner solutions are possible, i.e. some agents do not contribute to the provision of
the public good.1 Income transfers are also considered to be non-neutral when there
are cost di®erentials in the production of public goods among the providing agents
1Implicitly, Cornes and Sandler (1985: 107) already gave a ¯rst hint that the neutrality result
may become invalid, if not all agents make strictly positive contributions to the public good.
1(see Buchholz and Konrad 1995, Konrad and Lommerud 1995 as well as Ihori 1996).
Furthermore, income redistribution has an impact on the the overall provision level
when impure public goods are considered (see Cornes and Sandler 1984, 1996 as
well as Andreoni 1986, 1989, 1990). When impure public goods are considered,
the non-neutral outcome may be additionally perturbed by cost di®erentials in the
independent generation of the private characteristic of the impure public good (see
RÄ ubbelke 2002). And ¯nally, transfers of income are non-neutral when conditional
income transfers in the shape of subsidies are provided (see Bergstrom 1989 as well
as Buchholz 1990).
In our analysis, we investigate common tax refund schemes as applied in Germany
or the US. We illustrate how these systems promote private contributions to public
goods. The considered schemes feature two important characteristics which induce
interesting deviations from the standard strand of literature.
First, the schemes are systems of progressive income taxation. Progressive in-
come taxation implies degressive tax refund or subsidy rates.2 Consequently, in
contrast to former analyses of the in°uence of subsidies on the private provision of
public goods, we allow for subsidy rates that do not only vary among agents but
also vary across incomes and public good provision e®orts of an agent.
Second, a maximum level of donations is speci¯ed which is potentially deductible
from the income tax base. This implies that donors who pass this threshold receive
a quasi lump-sum subsidy which is independent of the amount they contribute. In
this case the e®ective price of the public good remains unchanged by the subsidy.
We allow the threshold to vary among agents in absolute monetary values, while the
maximum deductible donations in terms of a percentage of taxable income is equal
among agents.
The combination of deductibility from a progressive income tax and introduc-
tion of maximal deductible contribution levels bears interesting and complex conse-
quences for the private provision of public goods. We show that even in this case
neutrality with respect to the provision level may exist, yet a variety of scenarios may
arise in which subsidization is non-neutral. In the latter cases we observe interesting
changes of agents' welfare which are due to subsidy-induced price e®ects. Further-
more, we demonstrate that the tax refund schemes provide no e®ective means to
achieve an e±cient public good provision level.
We proceed as follows: The next section shortly recapitulates the basic results
on subsidizing private donations to a public good, given constant subsidy rates.
Thereafter, in section 3, we extend the analysis by considering a system where the
subsidies are provided in the shape of income tax refunds. Since the income taxation
is progressive, the subsidization is degressive. Then, in section 4, we further extend
2For an analysis of linear tax-subsidy policies with ¯xed individual subsidy rates see Kirchsteiger
and Puppe (1997).
2the model by introducing a maximum deductible level of donations. In section 5,
we draw conclusions on the appropriateness of the analyzed refund schemes.
Throughout, we stick to interior solutions and since the analysis already proves
to be rather involved, we neglect the implications of cost-di®erentials in the public
good provision.
2 Subsidizing Private Donations to Public Goods
Let us consider an economy in which conditional transfers in the form of subsidies
are paid by the government for private donations to the provision of public goods.
2.1 The Basic Model
An individual living in this economy derives utility from the consumption of a bun-
dle of private goods y and the aggregate level of a public good x. The public good
is produced via provision of donations whereby we assume that there are no pro-
ductivity di®erentials between agents. The agent receives some gross income I
g
i ,
i = 1;:::;n, which he spends on private goods yi and his contribution xi to the
public good. The aggregate provision of the public good x is given by the sum of
the agent's own contribution and the other agents donations ~ xi (~ xi =
Pn
j6=i xj).




U(yi;x) = U(yi;xi + ~ xi) (1)
s.t. yi + xi = I
g
i ; i = 1;::;n: (2)
For simplicity the prices of the public and private goods are set equal to unity.
Consequently, the e®ective price of the public good pe
i - the price of x in terms of
the price of y - is equal to unity.
Without loss of generality we can rewrite agent i's private budget constraint in
the following way: yi + x = I
g
i + ~ xi = Iv
i . Thus the RHS represents the virtual or
social income Iv
i , while the LHS denotes total expenditures associated with agent
i's utility level u(yi;x).
Maximizing utility subject to either the private or the social budget constraint




= 1 , MRSi(yi;x) = p
e
i: (3)
The result describes a unique Nash equilibrium (see Bergstrom, Blume and Varian
1986, 1992 as well as Cornes, Hartley and Sandler 1999).
3Condition (3) determines the income-expansion path (IEP) of the individual
agent. It represents the locus of all utility maximizing combinations of consumption
of the private good and the public good in the private-good/public-good plane for
di®erent income levels. That means, all combinations for which the marginal rate of
substitution between the individual's public and private goods consumption equals
the e®ective price pe
i = 1. Assuming that both types of goods, the public good
and the bundle of private goods, represent normal goods, the expansion paths are
strictly monotonic increasing.
By comparing (3) with the condition for a Pareto-optimal provision of the public
good (the so-called Samuelson condition)
n X
i=1
MRSi(yi;x) = 1 (4)
it becomes obvious that private provision without governmental intervention induces
a suboptimally low provision of the public good.
2.2 Governmental Intervention
Now consider that the government supports private donations to public goods by
granting a uniform subsidy rate z per unit contributed to the public good. These
subsidies are ¯nanced by an income tax T I
i and a head tax T H designed to close
the gap between the politically determined income tax revenues and the payment












assuming that debt ¯nancing is not permitted. In case that the subsidies are lower
than the overall revenues from taxation, the head tax will become negative, thus
representing a lump-sum transfer to the agents. Given the income tax tari®, the
revenue from income taxation is determined exogenously by the gross income of
individual agents. Consequently, changes in the provision of public goods only a®ect
the level of the head tax.
In the following we distinguish between naive and non-naive agents, showing
the consequences of naivety for optimal subsidization schemes. Naive agents are
assumed not to realize the impact of their own provision of the public good on the
level of the head tax (budget illusion). They perceive no wedge between net and
gross subsidy rates and neglect the e®ect on the head tax in their optimization.
As already stressed by Boadway, Pestieau and Wildasin (1989) this seems to be
a fairly realistic assumption for economies with a large number of agents. Yet,
the literature on the private provision to public goods often assumes agents to be
4non-naive. As Falkinger (1996: 416) puts it: \the assumption of budget illusion is
rather questionable". Which of the two scenarios is more appropriate, can hardly
be judged in general. To capture both extremes - complete budget illusion and no
budget illusion at all - we take a look at two scenarios: Case N, where it is assumed
that agents take the head tax to be exogenous to their decisions, and Case NN,
where agents have perfect information about the repercussions of their actions on
the governmental budget, and therefore, take the head tax to be endogenous.
The naive agent's budget constraint in the presence of taxation and subsidization
is given by:










i ¡ ¹ T
H; (6)
with In
i denoting net income after income taxation.
Non-naive agents on the other hand realize their e®ect on the head tax. They
know that of the received z per unit of the public good they have to self-¯nance 1
nz,
such that the net subsidy rate is reduced to n¡1
n z. Their budget constraint therefore
reads
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Maximization of (1) subject to (6) for Case N and (7) for Case NN respectively,
leads to the following optimality conditions with respect to the two cases:
Case N: MRSi(yi;x) = p
e
i = 1 ¡ z (8)
Case NN: MRSi(yi;x) = p
e




The e®ective price that an agent expects declines in both cases compared to the
non-intervention scenario, whereby the decline is larger in the naivety case. This is
due to the fact that the naive agent does not take into account that his own higher
provision of the public good increases the head tax, which he has to pay (or in case
of a negative head tax: decreases the amount he receives).
Equation (4) shows that for the provision of the public good to be Pareto-e±cient
the sum of the marginal rates of substitution over all agents has to be equal to unity.
Yet, summing up the conditions for an individually optimal provision (8), resp. (9),








MRSi = (1 ¡ z)n + z: (11)
5Consequently, if agents are identical, the Pareto-optimal solution can be imple-
mented by using a uniform subsidy rate. Then, z would have to be set at n¡1
n in the
naive case and unity in the non-naive case.
Yet it was shown by Falkinger (1996) that for z = 1 in the non-naive case only the
aggregate provision x but not the individual's provision xi is determined. With z = 1





yi by this relation in (8) shows that the optimal allocation between consumption of
the private good and the public good only depends on the aggregate provision of
x. This result is quite straightforward as with z = 1 it does not make a di®erence
with respect to the individual's budget constraint, whether an additional unit of the
public good is provided by the agent himself or by one of the other agents. Of a unit
provided by himself or by somebody else he equally has to bear 1
nth of the price of
the public good, such that he is indi®erent with respect to whom is contributing to
the public good.
Applying the same line of reasoning in the case of naive agents, we get yi =
(1=n)(Ig ¡ xi) ¡ ¹ T H, which depends on xi, such that the aggregate as well as the
individual contributions are determined in equilibrium.
However, if we allow for agents with di®ering preferences, it is not possible to
induce a Pareto-e±cient outcome by means of the suggested scheme, neither, if we
allow the agents to coordinate their activities. Consider that the individual agents
face the same e®ective prices within our scheme. If some agents have lower prefer-
ences for the public good than others their individual marginal rates of substitution
in (4) di®er. Since the e®ective prices of all agents are identical, some agents' Nash
conditions (8) or (9) are not met. They will become non-contributors of the public
good and total public-good provision remains on a suboptimal low level. In order to
achieve a Pareto-optimum, the government has to implement a subsidization scheme
which allows e®ective prices to vary across agents, such that each individual agent's
optimality condition can be met in the Pareto-optimum. Subsidization rates have
in this case to be tied to some speci¯c characteristic of the agent as it is considered
in the next section.
3 The Case of Income Tax-refunds
3.1 The General Idea
In many countries donors can credit their donations to speci¯c public goods with
respect to their income tax. More precisely, the donations are deducted from the in-
come tax base - in our case gross income - and therefore reduce income tax liabilities.
The refund is conditional on the contribution to the provision of the public good
and can therefore be considered as a conditional transfer/subsidy of the government
6to the donors. For simplicity we ¯rst assume the preference structure of agents to
be identical while incomes can di®er. Furthermore, we now focus our analysis on
non-naive agents, in order to make the analysis more stringent. Hence, we do not
have to recurrently distinguish between naive and non-naive case and the reader's
attention is not detracted from the analysis' main line of reasoning.
In the general set-up of the modi¯ed optimization problem we take account of the
fact that in many countries the income tax rate is not constant, but rather depends
on some personal characteristic of the agent, most commonly his after donation
income I
g
i ¡ xi. With tax rates depending on after donation income, income tax






























t(Ii)dIi; i = 1;:::;n; (12)
where t(Ii) is the marginal tax rate and Zi(I
g
i ;xi) denotes the tax refund or sub-
sidy as a function of gross income and the donation to the public good. Utility
maximization which is now subject to





















yields the following optimality conditions:






Hence, the marginal rate of substitution has to be equal to the e®ective price of the
public good from an agent's point of view. Summing up over all agents gives:
n X
j








which implies that for the provision of the public good to equal the Pareto-optimal
amount the sum over all marginal tax rates has to equal n.
This result can only be obtained by imposing a linear tari® with t = 1. Otherwise,
the considered agents, with identical preferences, would face di®erent e®ective prices
in the Nash equilibrium, such that this equilibrium would not be compatible with
the Pareto-optimal outcome.
It can easily be shown that in the case of a linear income tax the e®ects of intro-
ducing tax deductibility or applying the subsidy scheme discussed in the previous
7section are equivalent if the subsidy rate is set equal to the income tax rate.3 Yet
the distribution of income after taxation and subsidization may di®er under the two
schemes. In the economy we considered in the previous section, a subsidy rate of
unity does not imply anything per se about taxation, such that subsidy rates and
income tax rates may di®er. When we deal with tax deductibility, tax and subsidy
rates are equal.4
Let us now drop the assumption of identical preferences among agents. Rewriting









j ¡xj)=n = 1 shows that on average the marginal tax rate in the optimum
has to be unity. This implies that in the equilibrium marginal income tax rates have
to be above unity for some agents and below unity for others.5
3.2 Progressive Tax Schemes
Income tax schemes are often characterized by a progressive tari®, so let us take
a closer look on progressive taxation. Progressive tax schemes give rise to two
problematic properties with respect to the considered tax-refund systems: Firstly
progressive income taxation implies degressive subsidy rates when donations are
deductible from taxable income, implying that those agents with the highest income
level receive the highest subsidy rates. Secondly, it holds for each agent, regardless
of his gross income level, that the ¯rst unit of private provision of the public good
is funded at the highest rate, with rising provision the subsidy rate then declines.
In the equilibrium marginal bene¯t and e®ective price are equalized (Figure 1: x1).
It is obvious that the same amount of x would have been provided by the agent if
instead of degressive funding, an, e.g., progressive scheme would have been applied,
which is associated with a lower amount of subsidies to be paid by the government
to the agent.6
3The `modi¯ed' budget constraint of agent i under the tax refund system and linear taxation
reads
yi + xi = I
g
i ¡ t ¢ (I
g
i ¡ xi) ¡ T H
, yi + (1 ¡ t)xi = I
g
i ¡ T I
i (I
g
i ) ¡ T H
which is equivalent to (6) for t = z.
4Equality of tax and subsidy rates implies for Case NN and t = 1 that the government appro-
priates the complete gross income and redistributes it back to the agents in a lump-sum fashion
which leaves all agents with the same after tax income. Consequently, given that all agents have
identical preferences, all will contribute the same amount to the provision of the public good.
5The result of marginal tax rates that exceed unity may seem counterintuitive at ¯rst, yet, non-
naive agents realize that although the marginal tax rate is above unity, part of their tax payment
is redistributed to them via the head tax. Through this redistribution the net tax rate falls below
unity and part of the marginal income is left with the agent.
6As a simple example for a progressive tax scheme, let us assume that marginal tax rates are
given by t(I
g
i ¡ xi) = a ¢ (I
g
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Figure 1: Progressive vs degressive funding












has to hold. It can be seen that although agents perceive a to be exogenous, it does depend on the
aggregate provision of the public good which is endogenous to the model. For this tax scheme to
be implementable two further conditions have to be satis¯ed:
For e®ective prices { as perceived by the agents { to remain positive in the presence of subsidiza-
tion, an upper limit for the marginal tax rate in the post-subsidization optimum has to be speci¯ed.
From (14) it can be shown that the marginal tax rate has to stay below t(I
g
i ;xi) < n=(n ¡ 1).
Higher tax { and consequently subsidy { rates would be associated with a negative e®ective price
of the public good.
It can further be shown that for the tax scheme to be implementable the spread of incomes
in the society must not be too high. Making use of (16) and rearranging gives I
g





j ¡ x)=(n ¡ 1) which shows that the suggested tax scheme is only admissible if incomes
do not vary too much across agents. It should be noted though that it is the relative and not
the absolute spread of incomes that matters. Assume e.g. that all tax bases change by the same
factor. This would change the absolute spread of the income distribution, while the relative spread
remained unchanged. As the marginal tax rate is homogeneous of degree zero in Ii¡xi, i = 1;:::;n,
this exerts no e®ect on marginal taxes.
93.3 Preliminary Results
The analysis showed that an income-tax refund scheme can { in general { induce a
Pareto-e±cient outcome. However, then marginal income-tax rates equal or above
unity have to be raised. Yet with respect to real-world income tax schemes this
would hardly be politically realizable. On the contrary, income tax rates have even
declining during recent years in many countries. In the US, e.g., the top marginal
income-tax rate was lowered from 38.6% to 35% in 2003. And in Germany the
ongoing tax reform will lower the top marginal rate from 48.5% in 2003 to 42% in
2005.
Furthermore, the progression causes the e®ective price of the public good to
increase with rising provision level (subsidy rate declines). This seems to be coun-
terintuitive, given the fact of diminishing marginal utility of the public good con-
sumption. We can conclude that the income-tax refund scheme is no e®ective means
to induce a Pareto-e±cient private provision of public goods. This holds even more,
because tax schemes often limit the level of income-tax deduction. To illustrate the
problems arising from this limitation, we will subsequently have a closer look at such
income-tax schemes with limited deductibility.
4 Limited Tax Deductibility
To limit the amount of charitable contributions that are subsidized, tax laws of-
ten specify an upper bound to deductibility in the form of a maximal deductible
percentage of the income tax base: In the US up to 50% of a taxpayer's contribu-
tion base (i.e. adjusted gross income) can be deducted for the tax year,7 while in
Germany the maximum deductible amount is even limited to only 10% of an indi-
vidual's gross income. For donors who donate more than maximal deductible the
tax rebate turns into a quasi lump-sum subsidy, which is independent of the amount
they further contribute. In this case the e®ective price of the public good remains {
at the margin { unchanged by the subsidy.
4.1 Budget Constraint and E®ective Price
Following the above examples, we assume that the maximal deductible amount is
de¯ned in terms of the agent's gross income level (Imax
i (I
g
i )). More speci¯cally




i ) = b ¢ I
g
i , 0 · b · 1). The subsidy schemes we discussed in the previous
7Furthermore individuals in the USA may carry forward charitable contributions that exceed
the deductible ceiling for the contribution year for ¯ve years. The corporate limit in the US is
much lower at 10%.
10section would simply imply b = 1 and Imax
i = I
g
i . If the private provision of public
goods is not abetted by the government, b would be equal to zero.
Following this speci¯cation, the individual's virtual budget constraint has to be
amended to






















xi if 0 · xi · Imax
i
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i if xi > Imax
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The e®ective price of the public good after subsidization now depends on the level
of private donations. For 0 · xi < Imax





i < xi it is equal to 1.
Starting from the ¯rst unit of xi provided, the e®ective price of the public good
pe
i rises, assuming that the income tax tari® is progressive. When the maximal
deductible amount is reached, the price jumps back to unity as further provided
units of xi are not subsidized and the marginal subsidy rate drops to zero. Hence,
individuals for whom Imax
i < xi holds, receive a quasi lump-sum subsidy. Lump-sum
in the sense that the total subsidy is constant in xi, and only quasi lump-sum, since
the total amount of the subsidy depends on an individual's gross income.
4.2 E®ects of Limited Deductibility on the Isolation De-
mand
To visualize the e®ects that the combination of degressive subsidies and limited
deductibility have on the individual's decision problem, let us take a look at agent
i's isolation demand, i.e. his public-good demand when he is providing the public
good while the other agents, j = 1;::;n and j 6= i, do not provide (~ xi = 0) and
also not start to provide despite of the subsidization.8 In this sense we neglect the
public good characteristics of x in this section. (Yet the exercise seems useful, as
it will become clear that even in the case that only two agents are providing (see
next section) matters become quite involved which makes it hard to keep track of
individual e®ects.)
In absence of governmental activity the budget line of agent i is simply a straight
line with slope -1 (Figure 2: locus A). By introducing a progressive income tax with
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Figure 2: Implications of income taxation and limited deductibility of donations on
the private budget line.
deductibility of donations up to a percentage b of gross income, we can observe three
e®ects on the budget curve:
1. Taxation of gross income shifts the budget curve inward, leaving the agent with
a lower net income (locus B).
2. Funding of xi induces the absolute slope of the curve to rise for 0 · xi < bI
g
i , as
the e®ective price is decreasing (locus C). The higher the gross income level the
steeper the respective budget line is in this section as the subsidy rate increases
with income. Rising provision of xi on the other hand leads to a decrease in
the slope of each budget line as funding is degressive.
For xi > bI
g
i no more funding per unit is granted for extra units of xi and we
are back to an e®ective price of one. At xi = bI
g
i the budget line exhibits a
kink with the left-hand limit of the slope being ¡1 and the right-hand limit




3. Redistribution of collected net income tax revenues induces an outward shift
of the budget line. As the individual net income tax payment can never be
negative, the government runs a budget surplus after income taxation and
subsidization. The head tax becomes negative and households receive a lump-
sum transfer. As income taxation is progressive this implies a levelling e®ect
on the distribution of net income.
Whether or not governmental intervention leaves the agent better or worse
o® with respect to his personal income, depends on whether or not his after
donation income is above or below the average. Ceteris paribus the agent will






















































Equation (19) shows that an agent is better o® if his net income tax burden is
below the average which implies, since we are dealing with progressive taxation,
that his after donation income is also below the average. In Figure 2 locus D
depicts a situation, in which redistribution leads to a shift of the budget line
beyond the initial one (locus A), i.e. the transfer scheme raises the considered
agent's income.
If we integrated other agents' contributions to the public good ~ xi, the new budget
line would be locus E (Figure 3) where we took account of the fact that agent i can
never spend more than his private income In
i ¡ T H on private good consumption.
 









Figure 3: Integration of other agents' contributions.
However, for simplicity, let us temporarily consider the situation where agent i
is the only contributor and the post-subsidizing and -taxation is given by locus D.
We can now check for the e®ects of the limited-deductibility subsidizing scheme on
the optimal allocation between private and public goods. The set of all optima for
13varying incomes is given by the income expansion path (IEP) whose slope is (inter
alia) determined by the e®ective price of the public good. Consequently the position
of the IEP after subsidization depends crucially on the e®ect subsidization exerts
on the e®ective price, i.e. on the question on which the segment of D the point
of tangency with the indi®erence curve lies. Three basic types of cases have to be
distinguished, yet almost any combination of the three is also possible. Let's ¯rst
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i holds in the new equilibrium, agents receive a quasi lump-sum
subsidy. The e®ective price of the public good remains pegged at unity and the
optimality condition for the considered individual is the same as in the case
without governmental intervention:
MRSi = 1:
Subsidization results solely in an income e®ect, which induces a movement
outwards along the unchanged IEP (Figure 4 in which IEPold (pre-subsidization
IEP) = IEPnew (post-subsidization IEP)). No substitution e®ect arises.




In this case the points of tangency after governmental intervention lie on the
new steeper and non-linear section of the budget line. The relevant optimality
condition in this case reads:




Here subsidization not only results in an income e®ect, but also in a substitution
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Figure 5: IEP for Case B
the public good in the optimum has changed: pe
i has decreased which leads for
a given income level and under the assumption that both goods are normal to
an increase in the provision of x by agent i such that the IEP rotates upwards
(Figure 5).
In Figure 5 the slope of IEPold is depicted for an e®ective pre-subsidization
price of unity. In case that the e®ective price of the public good in the post-
subsidization optimum is still equal to unity { as in Case A { the slope of the
IEP remains, as we have seen, unchanged. Yet for a range of intramarginal
units subsidization reduces e®ective prices. If the post-subsidization optimum
lies in this range { as in Case B { the new IEP will be located above the initial





This case constitutes the switching point between non-zero and zero marginal
subsidy rates. As already explained the post-subsidy budget line exhibits a
kink at xi = bI
g
i with the left-hand limit of the slope being ¡1 and the right-
hand limit converging to ¡1 + n¡1
n t(I
g
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This case can be considered as a type of "lock-in" situation: Although an
agent's preferences for the public good might rise with rising income, the agent's
contribution to the public good will only increase in proportion to his income
as long as the above condition holds. ~ x¤new
i is therefore given by bI
g
i and the
IEP is a straight line (Figure 6).
Besides these three basic scenarios almost every combination of the three is conceiv-
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Figure 7: Exemplary IEP for a combination of Case A, B and C
the threshold level Imax
i (Figure 7, Case B). Marginal subsidy rates are positive and
the new IEP lies above the old. Then with rising income the agent's preference for
the public good increases, inducing a more than proportional increase in his optimal
provision of xi. At some income level (Figure 7: I
g
i1) his marginal rate of substitu-
tion ¯nally exceeds 1 ¡ n¡1
n t(I
g
i ¡ xi), but is still below unity. So for some range of
income 1 ¡ n¡1
n t(I
g
i ¡ xi) < MRSi < 1 holds (Case C) and the agent's contribution
rises in proportion b with his income. Yet at some income level (I
g
i3) his preference
for x might be high enough for MRSi = 1 to hold, such that he is back on the
pre-intervention expansion path (Case A).
Of course this scenario is only one of many possible. Depending on the utility
16function of the agent many combinations of the three segments are conceivable.
4.3 E®ects of Limited Deductibility for i = 2
So far we have only analyzed the reaction of one agent to the implementation of
a progressive income tax in combination with limited tax deductibility of private
donations. This helps of course to understand the e®ects with respect to the opti-
mization process of a single agent, yet it neglects that the other individuals will also
react to the implementation of governmental policy.
To keep the analysis again as tractable as possible we only consider interior
solutions in a 2-agent world, i.e. both agents i, i = 1;2, contribute to the public
good. The individual agent's maximization problem is described by (1) subject to
(17). From the ¯rst-order conditions and the individual and governmental budget
constraints we again get the IEPs of the two agents.
Let us reconsider the di®erent cases we distinguished in the previous section.
Even in the context of a relative simple two-agent{two-stage game six di®erent
combinations of Case A, B and C can potentially characterize the new equilibrium
(see Table 1). In the following analysis, we will take a closer look at the combinations
of Cases A and B in the post-subsidization equilibrium. Thereby we again focus on
interior solutions in the sense that we abstract from the knife-edge Case C.
Table 1: Reaction to implementation of limited deductibility
agent 1
Case A Case B Case C
Case A AA AB AC
agent 2 Case B AB BB BC
Case C AC BC CC
4.3.1 Scenario AA: xi > Imax
i , i = 1;2
In this scenario we assume that both agents provide funds to the public good in
excess of their respective deductible ceiling, such that both agents receive a quasi-
lump sum subsidy that leaves the e®ective price of the public good in the new
equilibrium una®ected. Consequently, by means of taxation and tax-refunding only
an income redistribution takes place which, as will be shown below, exerts no e®ect
on the aggregate level of public good provision, as it is only the sum of incomes,
but not their allocation between agents that matters with respect to the optimal
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Figure 8: Scenario AA
To obtain this result the budget constraint (17) is solved for yi and the resulting
expression inserted into (1). We now face the modi¯ed optimization problem
max




i + ~ xi ¡ x;x); (20)
where T N








































As under Scenario AA agents are assumed to donate in excess of their respective
maximal deductible amount, net transfers in (21) are independent of the actual
xi's and agents receive a ¯xed subsidy x¤
i = bI
g
i . The e®ective price in the post-
subsidization remains pegged at unity. Consequently the IEPs do not shift due to
subsidization.





i + ~ xi) = fi(I
v
i ): (22)
Thus x is a function of the agent's full or virtual income Iv
i , i.e. the sum of the
net income transfer T N
i , the monetary value of the enjoyed externality ~ xi and gross
income I
g
i . To the agent all components of Iv
i are exogenous and constitute perfect
substitutes. Due to this perfect-substitute property the agent is indi®erent between
a situation in which his net income transfer is raised by one unit and a situation
in which the other agent's public good provision level is increased by one unit. A
net income transfer from one agent to the other therefore only causes a rise in
the receiving agent's public good provision by the same amount, while the other
18agent will simultaneously reduce his own provision by this amount. In the new
equilibrium public good provision x, virtual incomes Iv
i , i = 1;2, and consequently
also the consumption of the private good yi remain unchanged. Yet the shares of x
that each agent provides rise or fall depending on whether an agent's private income
is increased or decreased by the redistribution. The new and old equilibrium are
sketched in Figure 8 where also the relevant sections of the indi®erence curves and
virtual budget lines are depicted.
4.3.2 Scenario AB (or BA equivalently): 0 < xi < Imax
i ;xj > Imax
j
With respect to Scenario AB we have to distinguish two types of e®ects that arise
due to the introduction of governmental policy:
² price e®ect: the e®ective price for the agent who stays below Imax
i in the
new equilibrium decreases while the e®ective price for the other who provides
xi > Imax
i remains pegged at unity (Figure 9: ¢pe
1 = 0 and ¢pe
2 6= 0).
² redistribution e®ect: incomes (and public good externalities) are redistributed
among agents leading to shifts in the regular budget lines, but itself exerting
no e®ect on aggregate x or the consumption pattern of the yi's (see reasoning
for Scenario AA).
 






















Figure 9: Scenario AB
So, essentially the reactions of x and the yi's can be attributed to the change in
the e®ective price of agent 2 only, i.e. to the substitution e®ect. (Remember that
with respect to Scenario AB we assume that the subsidization-induced changes in
agent 2's donations do not cause agent 1 to reduce his contributions to a level where
he donates less than deductible from his income tax.)
19The decrease in agent 2's e®ective price implies that he now faces a steeper
budget constraint. As both goods are normal the change in the e®ective price
implies that - taken the contribution of the other agent as ¯xed for the moment -
agent 2 wants to raise x in relation to y2, therefore raising his contribution to x.
Since the e®ective price for agent 1 remains unaltered the resulting combination of x
and y1 is suboptimal for him, as it implies that MRS1 is below unity. Consequently
he reallocates his consumption from x to y1 by decreasing his contribution to x
and raising y1. An adaptation process to the new equilibrium starts in which the
net e®ect of the decrease of pe
2 on x and consequently also on y1 is positive. Yet
recalling that the sum of incomes in the economy remains constant as governmental
intervention only implies a reallocation of income and also remembering that the
transformation rate between x and y is unity, the aggregated amount of public and
private goods that can be purchased by the agents remains the same.9 So if x and y1
increase y2 has to decrease by more than the increase of x (¢y1 +¢y2 +¢x = 0 ,
¢y1 +¢x = ¡¢y2 ) ¢x < ¡¢y2). Since at the outset the slope of the budget line
was equal to -1 this implies that the new equilibrium allocation of agent 2 will lie
below this line (Figure 9). To the right of the old equilibrium allocation of agent 2
the slope of the indi®erence curve which represented the optimal utility level before
e®ective-price reduction is above unity, such that the new equilibrium will always
lie below the old indi®erence curve and utility of agent 2 after subsidization has to
be lower which is due to the price-reducing impact of subsidization.
4.3.3 Scenario BB: 0 < xi < Imax
i , i = 1;2
Scenario BB can again be decomposed into a redistribution e®ect and a price ef-
fect. As before the redistribution e®ect alters the equilibrium composition of x, but
neither the aggregate provision of x nor the equilibrium demands for the private
good yi. Now both agents experience a decrease in the e®ective price of the public
good. As the e®ective price decreases for both agents, their joint provision of the
public good undoubtedly increases and the aggregate consumption of the private
good has to decrease. Yet with respect to individual demands and individual utility
the development is less clear. Although the tax-subsidization scheme might result in
a Pareto-improvement, this is not necessarily the case. The new equilibrium might
even be characterized by a reduction in welfare for both agents.
We know that as the transformation rate is equal to one, the decrease in the
9Recall that in the utility optimum before as well as after governmental intervention the joint





2 = x¤old + y¤old
1 + y¤old
2 (23)
= x¤new + y¤new
1 + y¤new
2 (24)
has to bind. This directly implies ¡¢x = ¢y1 + ¢y2.
20aggregate y1 + y2 has to be of the same magnitude as the increase in x. How
much the individual consumption of yi decreases depends on the shape of the utility
functions which determine the slope of the indi®erence curves and the tax regime












































Figure 10: Scenario BB { win-win situation
If preferences and tax regime are such that due to the tax-subsidy scheme both
agents' virtual budget lines shift outward at the relevant margin, each agent's virtual
income rises due to increased public good provision levels of the other agent, but the
equilibrium consumption of the private good decreases for both agents. The new
equilibrium can, but does not have to be associated with a Pareto-improvement.
In Figure 10 the case of a win-win situation is depicted in which both agents' util-
ity increases due to governmental intervention. The shaded areas in Figure 10 mark
all combinations of x and yi which are associated with higher than pre-subsidization
utility. In Figure 10 both agents' post-subsidization equilibrium allocations are lo-
cated in these shaded regions. It is however also conceivable that even if both budget
lines shift out the new equilibrium is not characterized by a Pareto-improvement.
Post-subsidization equilibria in which one agent's utility is reduced while the other
one's is increased (win-lose) or even a situation in which both agents lose (lose-lose)
are also imaginable. Both agents' utility can e.g. decline if the marginal subsidy
rate exceeds the Pareto-optimal rate and the sum of e®ective prices falls below
unity. In this case public good provision rises beyond the Pareto-optimal level while
private good consumption falls to a suboptimal low level. If the increase in pub-
lic good provision does not compensate agents for the associated decrease in yi,
utility will decline. In this case the new equilibrium allocation is characterized by
x¤new > x¤old and a y¤new
i which is located between pre-subsidization budget line and
pre-subsidization indi®erence curve.
If one agent's IEP rotation due to the subsidization is stronger than the rotation
21of the other agent's path it is also conceivable that he increases his contribution to
the public good by so much that this increase goes along with a fall in his private
consumption that is larger than the increase in x (see Figure 11). In this case his
virtual budget line shifts inward at the relevant margin and the other agent enjoys
an increase not only in the consumption of the public, but also of the private good.












































Figure 11: Scenario BB { win-lose situation
Finally, we have to consider the possibility of an inward shift of both agents'
virtual budget lines. As easily conceivable, this cannot be compatible with agents'
welfare maximizing behavior, as in this case the increase in x would be matched by
a larger decrease in the aggregate consumption of the private good. Part of of the
resources in the economy would be left unemployed and the utility of at least one
agent could be raised without making the other agent worse o®.
5 Conclusions
Last year, the top income tax rate in the USA was reduced and the same happened in
Germany this year. This will, of course, reduce incentives for taxpayers to donate for
public goods, since the tax-refund rate declines, i.e. the e®ective price of donations
rises. Therefore, the tax-refund (or tax-subsidy) scheme will become less e®ective
in shifting the public good provision level to a Pareto-e±cient outcome.
However, as our analysis demonstrated, the tax-refund scheme is not only inef-
fective due to low refund rates, it is also associated with decreasing subsidy rates
because of the progression in the tax-tari®s. While e®ective prices of donations
increase, marginal bene¯ts decline. This contradicts economic reasoning.
22Another obstacle to generate Pareto-e±ciency stems from the limited deductibil-
ity. While in the USA the maximum deductible amount is limited to 50 percent of
the tax base, in Germany it is even limited to 10 percent.
Keeping the just described problems in mind we examined whether and under
which circumstances the described governmental policy might nevertheless lead to
a Pareto-e±cient outcome or induce at least a Pareto-improvement. Implications
of introducing the tax-refund scheme were analyzed with respect to individual as
well as aggregate welfare. We demonstrated that even with respect to a still relative
simple two-agent-world the e®ects which arise due to the described governmental
intervention can be quite complex. Depending on the progressiveness of the income
tax schemes as well as the preferences of agents, Pareto-improvements might, but
do not have to be attainable.
Tax progressiveness and preferences determine whether agents donate more or
less than maximal deductible which is decisive for the type of reallocation and welfare
e®ects that arise. Di®erent scenarios are conceivable even in a simple two-agent
world: both agents might contribute beyond their deductible ceiling, both agents
might stay below this threshold or one agent might exceed it while the other donates
less than allowable.
Given that both agents donate more than maximal deductible, both agents re-
ceive a quasi lump-sum subsidy and subsidization has no impact on the e®ective
price of the public good. Then, of course, the Pareto-optimal solution cannot be
implemented and the tax-subsidy scheme only has an income-redistributing but no
national-welfare-improving impact. Even the individuals' welfare levels remain un-
changed.
Assuming that only one agent contributes beyond his deductible ceiling while
the other donates less, the marginal subsidy rate in the optimum becomes positive
for the latter agent. He faces a reduction of the e®ective price of the public good
which induces a reallocation between public and private good. As a consequence
the public good provision shifts closer to a Pareto-e±cient outcome, yet this will be
at the expense of the agent facing the reduced e®ective price of the public good.
Last but not least both agents might donate less than their maximal deductible
amount. In this case, the tax-subsidy scheme may raise both agents' utility, i.e. a
Pareto-improvement may be induced. Even the Pareto-optimum could be imple-
mented. However { again depending on the shape of the tax scheme and agents'
preferences { outcomes in which one or even both agents' welfare is reduced might
arise in the post subsidization equilibrium.
Interesting with respect to these welfare-implications is that the price e®ect of
the subsidization may be advantageous to rich as well as poor people. Provided
that rich people contribute in excess of their deductible ceiling, they face no price
e®ect while a poor person contributing less than its ceiling, will face an unfavorable
23price e®ect. On the other hand, given a scenario where both, poor and rich people
contribute less than their maximum deductible amount, the unfavorable price e®ect
of the tax-refund scheme will mainly hit the rich people, since they have a higher
marginal income tax rate.
Finally, let us summarize that the considered tax-refund schemes generally ap-
plied constitute no e®ective means to reduce suboptimal public good provision levels.
Implications with respect to public good provision as well as with respect to welfare
are not clear-cut, but depend crucially on e.g. deductibility ceilings and progres-
siveness of tax rates. The ine®ectiveness of the considered schemes is furthermore
reinforced by the reduction of income-tax rates, which is due to income tax reforms
in many Western countries. These reforms will most likely not only exert an e®ect
on the level of donations but might possibly also jumble welfare e®ects.
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